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Gas turbines are in operation around the world, used by many industries such as 
petrochemical, power generation, and oil and gas industries. Thus the safety of 
operating gas turbine is very crucial and is heavily concerned. Failure of gas turbine 
especially in those industries can result to risk related issues. An effective risk 
assessment model is required to assess failures associated with gas turbine and to 
achieve plant availability and efficiency. This study presents the development of a risk 
assessment model for gas turbine. The project is developed to assist and to help 
operators of gas turbine in determining the risk level of failures associated with the gas 
turbine. Several studies related to the project topic are carried out from journals and 
books available. A comprehensive literature research is conducted which consist of 
how to develop a risk assessment model, the overview of a gas turbine, getting 
familiarize with semi-quantitative risk assessment matrix method and Borda method. 
In this research risk matrix is proposed where it is a method to analyze risk by 
estimating failure probability and its consequences and categorize their associated 
failure risks. An input data for FMEA of a gas turbine used to drive electricity system 
has been adapted to determine each of the risks probability and consequence. For this 
project, the author has contributed by incorporating Borda method to risk ranking 
matrix. The Borda method helps to analyze the risk level more accurate than original 
risk matrix. Borda ranking method is also adapted to minimize the risk ties that exist 
in risk matrix. The sample of validated historical data of gas turbine system from the 
input data is used to help and justified the risk level for each failures associated. The 
results of the failure risks are then analyzed using risk ranking method and Borda 
method. The study has shown that risks of failure modes of gas turbine system are 
categorized in high, serious and medium levels based on risk matrix. There are five 
medium risks which are rotor out of balance, high temperature, high vibration, tip rub 
and foreign object damage. According to Borda ranking method, rotor out of balance, 
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1.1 Background of Study 
Risk assessment is the process mechanism to identify hazards, analyze and evaluate 
the risk associated with that hazard. To determine the appropriate ways to eliminate or 
control the hazard, there are various ways that we can approach to do the risk 
assessment. There are lots of risk assessment models are ready made for instances, 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Event Tree Analysis (ETA), Failure Mode and Effect 
Analysis (FMEA), Risk Matrix and etc. Different model has different approach.  
FMEA for example assumes a failure mode occurs in a system/component through 
some failure mechanism; the effect of this failure on the other systems is then evaluated 
[11].  
 
For this project, the approach used to do the risk assessment is risk matrix. A risk 
matrix approach is a semi-quantitative way of evaluating risk. In order to develop the 
risk assessment matrix, failure probabilities scale and its consequences scale are 
developed. After the scales are determined, the semi-quantitative risk assessment 
matrix 5 by 4 that is taken from Standard Practice for System Safety [17] is applied. 
The risk level are divided into four categories Low, Medium, Serious and High. 
However, there are still risk ties existed in the risk matrix. Thus in this research Borda 
method has been introduced to the model. Borda ranking method helps to minimize 
risk ties and produces more accurate result of categorizing the risk level [19].  A 
collection of statistic data of failures in a gas turbine system are then adapted from a 
case study [18]. The data is the FMEA analysis of gas turbine system that listed every 
failures probabilities and consequences. 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
Modern gas turbine engines are generally considered to exhibit a high level of hazards 
and failure rates. Fire and explosion hazards in offshore gas turbines is one of the 
example of hazards [7]. Failure modes usually happen in the critical component of gas 
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turbine system like blades, nozzle and compressor [14]. Therefore, risk assessment of 
the failure modes in a gas turbine system is crucial to estimate and categorize the 
failure risks into certain risk levels. Thus reducing the possibility of failure risks as 
much as possible. In this project, the author will focus on developing a risk assessment 
model particularly to determine the risk level of failure modes in a gas turbine system. 
 
1.3 Objectives 
The objective of this research is to develop a semi-quantitative risk assessment 
matrix of a gas turbine used to drive an offshore electricity generating system. 
 
1.4 Scope of Study 
The scope of the project covers the following: 
i. Main components of gas turbine system, which are compressor, turbine and 
combustion chamber that are critical and usually exposed to failures.  
ii. Input data for the FMECA of a gas turbine system used to drive an offshore 
electricity generating system is adapted [18]. 
iii. Semi-quantitative risk analysis that combines both advantages qualitative and 
quantitative analysis [16]. 
iv. Borda method that is usually used in voting count is applied to minimize the 
risk ties exist in risk matrix [21]. 
 
1.5 Significance of the Project 
The project is significant to assist the small gas turbines operators to evaluate the 










2.1 Introduction  
This literature review covers the important elements and foundation of this project 
research. Few articles and journals that are related to this project are summarized into 
five reviews which consist of analysis of risk, development of risk assessment model, 
risk matrix method, Borda method, overview of a gas turbine and common failures in 
gas turbine system.  
 
2.2 Analysis of Risk 
There are many types of explanations about risk in literature. Risk used to mean the 
danger like being bitten by a beast or infected by a disease in the long past [15]. Then 
risk was researched and more elaborated descriptions were developed. For example, 
Rosenbloom [25] defines risk as the uncertainty of loss. Williams and Heins [27] 
defines risk as the alteration of future results under a given circumstance in a specific 
period. Wang [26] defines risk as the possibility of unfavourable results and the related 
loss of a chosen decision plan due to various uncertainties in the decision making 
process. Furthermore, the standard definition of risk provided by ISO 2002 is the 
combination of the probability of an event and its consequence. This definition has 
also been agreed by Dieter [5] where risk is defined as the product of likelihood of 
occurrence and the impact severity of occurrence of the event. In a simple equation, 




) = 𝐿𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑 (
𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒





There are three basic components of a risk [15]: 
 
1. Risk factor refers to the conditions leading to the potential loss. 
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2. Loss means all kinds of unexpected loss, including casualty and financial cost 
caused by risk. 
3. Incident may be the key component as the direct reason which changes potential 
loss to actual loss. 
 
The author believes that risk is one of the most important criteria that needs to be 
highlighted at every workplace where most hazards existed. Therefore, risk has to be 
studied in order to reduce its probability and consequence of each event. Yerevan [13] 
stated in his journal that the structure of Risk Analysis is categorized into three parts 
which are Risk Assessment, Risk Management and Risk Communication. 
For this development of risk assessment model project, as per title, the author will only 
focus on Risk Assessment. Figure 1 shows the risk assessment has four components 
assigned to it which are: 
i. Hazard identification 
ii. Hazard characterization 
iii. Exposure assessment 
iv. Risk characterization 
 
 






2.3 Development of Risk Assessment Model 
A risk assessment model (RAM) is developed to assist the safety professionals’ risk 
assessment work and to help staffs, specifically the gas turbine operators to understand 
risks existing in their works. The RAM can provide analysis methods to analyze the 
historical data and later evaluate and categorize risks based on risk levels [1]. The risk 
levels of different work trades prioritized by the RAM provide important information 
for safety professionals for carrying out a reliable risk assessment. The general 
principle of the RAM can be shown in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2. Principle of RAM. Source: [6] 
 
There are lots of approaches to do risk assessment for examples, which are Fault Tree 
Analysis (FTA), Event Tree Analysis (ETA), Failure Mode and Effect Analysis 
(FMEA), and Risk Matrix. Each approach uses different kind of method and thus result 
in different risk categorization.  
Mainly, there are three ways to execute a risk assessment, specifically, qualitative way, 
semi-quantitative way and quantitative way. Quantitative method depends on 
probabilistic and statistic and databases. Meanwhile qualitative analysis method uses 
judgment and sometimes “expert” opinion to evaluate the probability and 
consequences [10]. Meanwhile the semi-quantitative way combines both advantages 
of qualitative and quantitative, hence is widely applied in many kinds of assessment 
problems. In risk management, risk matrix approach (RMA) is a typical semi-
quantitative assessment tool to evaluate various kinds of risks based on historically 
statistic data [15]. Though it is not as accurate as quantitative analysis and lack of 
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meticulous mathematical basis, the criteria of graphical expression, easy to understand 
and easy to apply still make it well received in manufacture, service and other 
industries. Moreover, various forms and standards of RMA such as MIL-STD-882D 
[17] from US Department of Defense are continuously developed. 
 
2.4 Risk Matrix Method 
Risk assessment matrix is a classic tool to perform semi-quantitative risk assessment 
[12]. There are various type of risk assessment matrix. Some of the risk matrix are 3 
by 3, 4 by 4, 5 by 5, and 7 + 7 [23]. Meanwhile Souza showed in his book that he uses 
6 by 6 risk matrix as shown in Figure 4 [11]. The risk matrix cells can in form of 
alphabetical or numerical. For alphabetical ones, commonly Low (L), Medium (M) 
and High (H) are used. As for the numerical ones, the number range depends on the 
scaling of the probability and consequence. The original risk matrix (ORM) as in 
Figure 3 is widely used around the world.  Lots of companies realizes the importance 
for risk assessment, but usually they do not have the tools, experience and resources 
to assess risk quantitatively [9]. Thus, they use qualitative, quantitative or semi 
quantitative risk assessment tools, such as risk ranking which is quite easy to develop. 
 
Critical M H H H H 
Serious M M M H H 
Moderate L M M M H 
Minor L L M M H 
Negligible L L L M M 
Origin 0.00~0.10 0.10~0.40 0.40~0.60 0.60~0.90 0.90~1.00 
Figure 3. Original risk matrix. Source: [15] 
Many organizations acknowledge risk matrix is easy to use. However, not many 
concern that the risk matrix needs to be designed precisely. If not, the risk matrix may 
produce liability issues and give the wrong sense of security. According to Ozog, an 
effective risk ranking matrix should have the following attributes [10]: 
 
• Be simple to use and understand 
• Not require extensive knowledge of quantitative risk analysis to use 




• Have detailed descriptions of the consequences of concern for each 
consequence range 
• Have clearly defined tolerable and intolerable risk levels 
• Show how scenarios that are at an intolerable risk level can be mitigated to 
a tolerable risk level on the matrix 
• Provide clear guidance on what action is necessary to mitigate scenarios 
with intolerable risk levels 
 
2.4.1 Basic Rules of Risk Matrix 
 
To produce a risk matrix, some basic rules should be followed [14]: 
 
1. The risk matrix is the standard definition of risk as a combination of severity of the 
consequences and its probability. Meaning that only two input variables are required 
to construct a risk matrix. The output risk level is determined only by the severity of 
the consequences and its probability. 
 
2. The severity of consequences, probability and output risk level can be divided into 
different levels, respectively, with qualitative descriptions and scales. 
 
3. The calculation step of risk matrix is presented by the logic implication as: if 




A L M M H H H 
B L L M M H H 
C L L L M M H 
D L L L L M M 
E L L L L L M 
F L L L L L L 
 VI V IV III II I 
 Consequence Category 




2.5 Borda Ranking Method 
Once a risk matrix is developed with complete output of risk levels consist of Low, 
Medium and High, there is a critical argument: Which risk is most critical? [19] As 
shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4, they only support three distinct ratings (Low, Medium 
and High). In such risk matrix, there are many risk ties exist. Hence to solve the 
problem with risk ties, a famous voting theory is incorporated into risk matrix, namely 
the Borda method.  
 
Borda method is a famous ranking method that assigns scores according to the 
positions of the item in the ranked lists [21]. Lamboray also explained Borda's well-
known rule orders the alternatives according to their sums of ranks they occupy in the 
profile [20]. Introducing Borda method (BM) [22] to risk matrix has significantly 
reduced the number of risk ties because of its quantitative calculation. This method 
helps to rank risks from most critical to least critical on the basis of multiple evaluation 
criteria [21]. 
 
To apply Borda method into the risk matrix approach, the following variables are 
defined. 
 
N: The number of risk to be evaluated. 
k: The evaluation criteria (severity, probability). 
rik: The number of risk with a higher level than risk i under evaluation criterion k. 
bi: The Borda index for risk i. 
 
So the Borda index for each risk can be computed by the following formula. 
 
𝑏𝑖 =  ∑ (𝑁 − 𝑟𝑖𝑘)𝑘       (Equation 1) 
 
The risks are then ordered according to the bi counts. If ties are present in the criteria 
rankings, the rik are adjusted by evaluating the rank for a tied alternatives as the 





2.3 Overview of a Gas Turbine  
A gas turbine is a complex system with lots of rotary and stationary parts is used for 
generating electric power. The gas turbine is quite new in the history of energy 
conversion. The first practical gas turbine used to generate electricity ran at Neuchafel, 
Switzerland in 1939 and was developed by the Brown Boveri Company [8]. 
 
Figure 5. Example of a Gas Turbine. Source: [2] 
 
In a gas turbine unit, the inlet ambient air is compressed by passing through several 
stages of stationary and rotary blades and can then be used both in the combustion 
chamber and for cooling purposes. The compressed air that enters the combustion 
chamber is mixed with fuel and is ignited to provide a high pressure, high velocity, 
and high temperature gas flow that is able to drive the turbine shaft at high rotary 
speeds [2]. However, due to the precise design conditions of gas turbine units and the 
high rotary speeds at which they operate, the malfunction of one component can lead 
to severe damage to the entire unit. In between, the rotary and stationary parts of the 
turbine section, such as blades and disks, are more prone to failure because they work 
in a corrosive environment under a high temperature gas flow with a high pressure 
gradient [3]. 
 
Figure 6. Gas turbine system is divided into three sections; compressor, turbine and 
combustion chamber. Source: [2] 
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The reason why gas turbine is very practical and being used by many companies is 
because it has lots of advantages. Some of the principle advantages of the gas turbine 
are because it can produce large amounts of useful power for a relatively small size 
and weight. Since motion of all its major components involve pure rotation (i.e. no 
reciprocating motion as in a piston engine), its mechanical life is long and the 
corresponding maintenance cost is relatively low. Even though the gas turbine must 
be started by some external means (a small external motor or other source, such as 
another gas turbine), it can be brought up to full-load (peak output) conditions in 
minutes as contrasted to a steam turbine plant whose start up time is measured in hours. 
A wide variety of fuels can be utilized. Natural gas is commonly used in land-based 
gas turbines while light distillate (kerosene-like) oils power aircraft gas turbines. 
Diesel oil or specially treated residual oils can also be used, as well as combustible 
gases derived from blast furnaces, refineries and the gasification of solid fuels such as 
coal, wood chips and bagasse. The usual working fluid is atmospheric air. As a basic 
power supply, the gas turbine requires no coolant (e.g. water). 
 
Figure 7 shows is the functional tree of a gas turbine where it listed down the main 
systems and components of a gas turbine system. The equipment is divided into five 
main subsystems: trunnion support, compressor, combustors, power turbine and 
start/stop subsystem [11]. Those main subsystems are divided into more detailed 





Figure 7. Functional Tree of Gas Turbine. Source: [11]  
 
2.6 Common Failures in Gas Turbine System 
Common failures in the gas turbine system were studied by different authors, with the 
aim of preventing future failures by improving the mechanical design, designing new 
materials, or proposing guidelines for better maintenance and utilization of gas turbine 
units. The failure mechanism of the gas turbine due to damage in turbine disks or 
blades is studied in by using visual inspection, macro and micro fractography, and 
numerical mechanical analyses. In these studies, the fatigue fracture, existence of 
region with high stress levels, creep, foreign object damage, and material degradation 
due to surface erosion were identified as the main failure mechanisms.  
 
The common failure modes of a general gas turbine can be classified as follows, shown 




Table 1. Failure modes of gas turbine system [14] 
Component Element Failure modes 
Compressor Rotor blades Fatigue, erosion, foreign object 
Rotor (disk) Fatigue, creep 
Turbine Rotor blades Creep, fatigue, corrosion, erosion 
Rotor (disk) Creep, rupture, fatigue 
Stators Creep, fatigue, corrosion, erosion, buckling 
Combustion 
chamber 
Linear  Fatigue, creep, buckling 
Casing Fatigue 
 
2.6.1 Foreign object damage (FOD) 
Foreign object damage is caused by the intake of huge objects into the flow direction. 
These happened due to the internal pieces were broken in the components. 
2.6.2 Creep 
Creep is the tendency of a solid material to slowly move or deform permanently under 
the influence of stresses. It was the result of long time exposure to high levels of stress 
that are below the yield strength of the material. Creep is more critical in materials that 
are exposed to heat for long term, and near melting point. Creep always increases with 
temperature. 
2.6.3 Fouling 
Fouling is present in compressor and turbine component. In compressor, fouling is 
caused by submission of peculiar contaminants to airfoil and annulus surfaces. 
Meanwhile in turbine, the ash adherence on the turbine blade surfaces has caused the 
fouling. Fouling altered the shape of blade and elevated surface roughness that 
decreased mass flow, power output and efficiency. The former investigation showed 
in which the reduction of 5% mass flow can affect power output to reduce 13%, so it 




2.6.4 Hot corrosion 
Hot corrosion is an expanded oxidation caused by the existence of deposit. The deposit 
can contain salt contaminants, such as Na2SO4, NaCl, and V2O5. These contaminants 
combine to form molten deposits. But corrosion can also be enhanced by the influence 
of a solid or a gas. The phenomenon is obviously life limiting for turbine blade 
structural materials. 
2.6.5 Erosion 
Gas turbine engines operates in a hostile environment that is polluted with small 
particles are susceptible to erosion damage. Examination of a number of natural dust 
samples indicates that quartz is usually the most abundant erosive constituent, rarely 
falling below 70% by weight. Erosion is caused by the abrasive components that 
remove component materials from surface. This results in slight changes in shape and 
an increase in surface roughness, especially on the pressure side. 
2.6.6 Fatigue 
Fatigue is the progressive and localized structural damage that occurs when a material 
is subjected to cyclic loading. The nominal maximum stress values are less than the 
ultimate tensile stress limit, and may be below the yield stress limit of the material. 
2.7 Conclusion of Literature Review 
A comprehensive of literature reviews have been conducted after doing few researches 
from books, journals and websites. The project to develop a risk assessment model can 












Methodology explains how the process of developing the risk assessment model. It 
includes the research methodology of the project and project activities in the given 
time that consists of phase 1 and phase 2. 
3.2 Research Methodology 
In order to achieve the objective of the research, a suitable methodology is required. 
Figure 8 shows the flow chart for the project where steps were defined to develop the 
semi-quantitative risk assessment matrix for gas turbine. 
 
Figure 8. Flowchart of methodology 
Failure analysis of gas 
turbine
Development of risk assessment matrix
• 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘, 𝑅 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦, 𝑃 × 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠, 𝐶
Development of failure 
probabilities ranges




Risk ranking using Borda method
• 𝑏𝑖 = ∑𝑘(𝑁 − 𝑟𝑖𝑘)
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3.2.1 Failure analysis of gas turbine 
First step of the risk assessment model was to analyze the failures associated to gas 
turbine. Well failure understanding guides to real problem reasons what causes the 
failure in gas turbine system. In order to analyse the failures of gas turbine system, an 
input data for the failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) of a gas turbine used to 
drive an offshore electricity generating system had been adapted [11]. The input 
benefited from the combined experience of experts in gas turbine manufacturing and 
operating companies who were members of the Loughborough University Rotating 
Machinery Reliability Group. Table 2 shows failure modes of a gas turbine system that 
had been taken as the case study. There are total of 12 risks from the critical subsystems 
of the gas turbine which are compressor, turbine and combustion chamber. 











2 Rotor out of balance 
3 Rotor bend distortion 
4 High temperature 
5 High vibration 
6 Tip rub 
7 Blade failure or inlet guide vane failure 
8 Thrust bearing failure 
9 Radial bearing failure 




Explosion in combustion chamber 




3.2.2 Development of risk assessment matrix 
Risk assessment matrix was developed from a quantitative risk analysis and combined 
with qualitative analysis. To develop semi-quantitative risk assessment matrix, some 
basic rules are used: 
 
i. The risk matrix is the standard definition of risk as a combination of severity 
of the consequences and its probability [14]. Meaning that only two input 
variables are required to construct a risk matrix. The output risk level is 
determined only by the severity of the consequences and its probability. 
 
ii. The severity of consequences, probability and output risk level can be divided 
into different levels, respectively, with qualitative descriptions and scales. 
 
iii. The calculation step of risk matrix is presented by the logic implication as: if 
probability is P and severity of consequence is C, then risk is R [14]. 
 
There are various type of risk assessment matrix. Some of the risk matrix are 3 by 3, 
4 by 4, 5 by 5 and 7 + 7 [23]. According to MIL-STD-882D, there is also a standard 
practice of risk matrix for system safety [17] which is 5 by 4 matrix. For this project, 
the author decided to use the 5 by 4 risk matrix that has been developed by the US 
military because it is famous and has been widely applied as standard practice for 
system safety. 
3.2.3 Development of failure probability ranges 
After the rules of developing risk matrix had been discussed, the failure probability 
ranges were defined. The failure rate range scale based on the probability of failure 
shown in Table 3, adapted from MIL-STD-882D [17]. The scales have 5 different 
attributes which are Frequent, Probable, Occasional, Remote and Improbable. Each 
attributes have their own descriptions. Frequent was defined as greater than 1 in a year 
which is the highest range in the probability scales. Meanwhile, Improbable which was 
defined as less than 0.001 in a year being the lowest range. The scales could be further 
enhanced since various firms may have their own residual risk criterion. 
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Table 3. Failure rate range scale 
Frequent Greater than 1 in a year 
Probable Less than 1 but greater than 0.1 in a year 
Occasional 
Less than 0.1 but greater than 0.01 in a 
year 
Remote 
Less than 0.01 but greater than 0.001 in a 
year 
Improbable Less than 0.001 in a year 
 
3.2.4 Development of failure consequences ranges 
The failure consequences are categorized according to their severity of impact. The 
failure consequences can be based on experiences of personnel and operators of gas 
turbine and historical statistic data. Qualitative values are used to rank the failure risks 
of gas turbine. As shown in Table 4, the failure consequences of failure of gas turbine 
are adapted from MIL-STD-882D [17]. The consequences range scales consist of four 
attributes which are Catastrophic, Critical, Marginal and Negligible. Catastrophic is 
the most critical impact which can cause plant shutdown and may affect other system 
components and environment. The least critical attribute is Negligible where the 
impact has no effect to the performance of plant.  
Table 4. Failure consequence scale 
Catastrophic 
Plant shutdown, and may affect other 
system components and environment 
Critical Plant shutdown, no other effect 
Marginal Degraded performance of plant 
Negligible No affect to performance of plant 
 
3.2.5 Formulation of risk matrix 
Risk matrix was developed after the risk parameter scales which are failure rate range 
scale and failure consequence range scale are defined. Table 5 shows the proposed risk 
assessment matrix that is adapted from MIL-STD-882D [17]. The cell which have 
number “1” is product of “Catastrophic” failure consequence and “Frequent” failure 
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probability. It is also ranked as the highest risk level. Meanwhile, the cell which have 
number “20” is product of “Negligible” failure consequence and “Improbable” failure 
probability. The number “20” ranks as the lowest risk level. The case is uniform for 
all matrix cells from 1-20, each cell is a product of probability, P and consequence, C. 
Table 5. Semi-quantitative risk assessment matrix [13] 
 Consequence 
Probability 
 Catastrophic Critical Marginal Negligible 
Frequent 1 3 7 13 
Probable 2 5 9 16 
Occasional 4 6 11 18 
Remote 8 10 14 19 
Improbable 12 15 17 20 
 
3.2.6 Risk categorization 
For a risk matrix, there are two types. Alphabetical mode, where L (Low), M 
(Medium), Serious (S) and H (High) are used to define the tolerable level of risk and 
numerical mode, where value of number  1 until 20 are used instead. The value helps 
to categorize the failures risk accordingly. Table 6 shows the different ranges of cell 
values to categorize failures based on combined effect of failure probability and its 
consequence. In this proposed risk assessment matrix, cell values from 1 to 5 shows 
High risk and the risk not acceptable. Values 6 to 9 are categorized as Serious where 
the risk is not desirable. Values 10 to 17 present failures as Medium and the risk is 
acceptable with review. Lastly, failures in category Low has values from 18 to 20. The 
Low risk is acceptable without review. 
Table 6. Semi-quantitative risk assessment matrix values [13] 
Risk assessment value Failure category Failure risk acceptance level 
1 – 5 High Not acceptable 
6 – 9 Serious Not desirable 
10 – 17 Medium Acceptable with review 




3.2.7 Risk ranking using Borda method 
To determine which risk is more critical, the risk matrix is still not enough and possible 
as the risk matrix only separates the failure risks in four categories generally as High, 
Serious, Medium and Low. These four categories do not represent actual situation 
whereby there are many risk ties exist. In order to minimize the risk ties, Borda ranking 
method is employed [19]. Borda ranking method applies Equation 1 to rank failure 
risks. Borda method needs certain number for each failure consequence and probability 
category as shown in Table 7 and Table 8. 
Table 7. Failure consequence range scale values 
Catastrophic Critical Marginal Negligible 
4 3 2 1 
 
Table 8. Failure rate range scale values 
Frequent Probable Occasional Remote Improbable 
5 4 3 2 1 
 
𝑏𝑖 =  ∑ (𝑁 − 𝑟𝑖𝑘)𝑘       (Equation 1) 
where, N represents the total number of risk to be evaluated, i is a particular risk, for 
criteria k. There are two conditions for risk matrix: k = 1 is representing failure 
consequence, C, k = 2 refers to failure probability, P. If the risk level is rik and i is 
within the criteria, then Equation 1 produces Borda count of risk i.  
After the values of bi are calculated for each risk, the values can be sorted according 
to the small to large order. The Borda rank for a given risk is the number of other risks 
that are more critical. 
For example, there is a sample data as in Table 9. Risk 1 has the failure rate range of 
Remote (2) and failure consequence range of Catastrophic (4). For Risk 2, the failure 
rate range is Remote (2) and failure consequence range of Critical (3).  Risk 3 has the 
failure rate range of Occasional (3) and failure consequence range of Critical (3). By 
using the risk matrix in Table 5, Risk 1 and Risk 3 ties to Serious category meanwhile 
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Risk 2 is categorized as Medium. To categorize the risk ties, the useful Borda method 
can solve the problem. The calculation should be as follows. 
Table 9. Example data to demonstrate Borda method 
No of 
risks 
Failure probabilities Failure consequences 
Category Scale Category Scale 
1 Remote 2 Catastrophic 4 
2 Remote 2 Critical 3 
3 Occasional 3 Critical 3 
 
Risk 1: 𝑏𝑖 =  ∑ (𝑁 − 𝑟𝑖𝑘)𝑘 = (3 − 1) + (3 − 0) = 5 
Risk 2: 𝑏𝑖 =  ∑ (𝑁 − 𝑟𝑖𝑘)𝑘 = (3 − 1) = (3 − 1) = 4 
Risk 3: 𝑏𝑖 =  ∑ (𝑁 − 𝑟𝑖𝑘)𝑘 = (3 − 0) = (3 − 1) = 5 
Respective to the bi values, the Borda rank for Risk 1 and Risk 3 are 0, which mean 
they are most critical and Risk 2 is ranked 2, meaning it is the least critical risk.    
 
3.3 Project Activities 
The project activities consists of 8 tasks. There are 2 phases in the execution. 
Table 10. Project activities of the project 
Task Activities 
Project preparation  Title Discussion 
 Title Approval 
 Preliminary Research Work 
Extended Proposal  Submission of Extended Proposal 
 Proposal Defense 
Project Execution 
Phase 1 
 Literature survey 
- Overview of a Gas Turbine 
- Development of Risk Assessment Model (RAM) 
- Risk Matrix method 
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 Familiarization with risk assessment methods 
- There are many methods of RAM such FMEA, 
FTA/ETA, HAZOP and etc. 
- In this project, I will focus on Risk Matrix. 
 Gathering of parameters and equations for risk 
assessment 
- Risk= Probabilty x Consequence 
 Preliminary work on model development 
Project Break  Submission of Interim Report 
Project Execution 
Phase 2 
 Development of risk assessment model 
 
Progress Report  Submission of Progress Report 
Pre - SEDEX  Poster presentation 
Project Closed Out  Project Documentation 
– Dissertation (Soft Bound) 
– Technical Paper 
– Dissertation (Hard Bound) 
 Oral Presentation 
 
3.4 Key Milestone 
The key milestone of the project is divided into two; Final Year Project 1 and Final 
Year Project 2. 
3.4.1 Final Year Project 1 (FYP1) 
Table 11. Key milestone in FYP1 
Deliverable Target Date 
Submission of Extended Proposal Week 6 
Proposal Defense Week 8 – 9 
Submission of draft Interim Report Week 13 




3.4.2 Final Year Project 2 (FYP2) 
Table 12. Key milestone in FYP2 
Event or Deliverable Target Date 
Submission of Progress Report Week 8 
Pre – SEDEX Week 11 
Submission of Draft Report Week 12 
Submission of Dissertation (Soft Bound) Week 13 
Submission of Technical Paper Week 13 
Oral Presentation Week 14 
Submission of Dissertation (Hard Bound) Week 15 
 
3.5 Tools 
The basis of this project is mainly researching and developing theory. In the early 
part of the research, mostly the author studied and researched technical papers and 
journal from subscribed online database for research purpose. Microsoft Word and 
Microsoft Excel are the tools applied in this research.     
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3.6 Gantt Chart 


















FINAL YEAR PROJECT 2 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
First Meeting with 
Coordinators and 
Supervisor 
                             
Familiarization with Risk 
Assessments 
                             
Submission of Extended 
Proposal Defense 
                             
Proposal Defense                               
Preliminary Development 
of Risk Assessment Model 
                             
Submission of Interim 
Draft Report 
                             
Submission of Interim 
Report 
                             
Development of Risk 
Assessment Matrix 
                             
Submission of Progress 
Report 
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Development of Risk 
Assessment Matrix 
Continues 
                             
Pre-SEDEX                              
Submission of Draft 
Report 
                             
Submission of 
Dissertation (Soft Bound) 
                             
Submission of Technical 
Paper 
                             
Oral Presentation                              
Submission of 
Dissertation (Hard Bound) 




RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
To conduct and demonstrate the use of proposed methods of failure risk assessment model, the 
case study of FMEA for a gas turbine used to drive an offshore electricity system is applied 
[18]. There are risk matrix method and Borda method. To carry out the risk assessment, the 
failure probability and failure consequence for each failure modes of gas turbine system are 
first determined and discussed. The risk assessment then is executed in the following steps. 
 
4.0 Analysis of Failures 
The failure modes of gas turbine used to drive an offshore electricity system has been adapted 
[15] as in Table 13 and failure ranges were assumed. The input benefited from the combined 
experience of experts in gas turbine manufacturing and operating companies who were 
members of the Loughborough University Rotating Machinery Reliability Group. Gas turbine 
system has 12 failure modes where each failure mode contributed to the failure of gas turbine 
system. The failure modes are from the critical parts of the gas turbine system which are 
compressor, turbine and combustion chamber. As stated in MIL-STD-882D standard, scales 
for failure probability are adjustable depending on the suitable situation. For each failure mode, 
the failure ranges were assigned and categorized based on their rate of occurrence. There are 
remote, probable and occasional ranges having the value of 2, 3 and 4 as shown in Table 13. 
Every category of failure probabilities has four risks assigned to them which means there are 4 
remote, 4 occasional and 4 probable occurrence rate.  
Consequences of failure categories are defined for each failure modes of the gas turbine system 
as shown in Table 13. There is only one failure mode which is Risk no. 1 (Overspeed) has 
catastrophic impact. Mostly, the risks have critical impact to the gas turbine system. There are 
8 out of 12 risks having critical consequence that is third-quarter of the total risks. There is also 
a single failure mode that has marginal impact which is Risk 9 (Radial bearing failure).  The 









Failure probabilities Failure consequences 
Category Scale Category Scale 
1 Overspeed Remote 2 Catastrophic 4 
2 
Rotor out of 
balance 




Occasional 3 Critical 3 
4 High temperature Probable 4 Negligible 1 
5 High vibration Probable 4 Negligible 1 
6 Tip rub Remote 2 Critical 3 
7 
Blade failure or 
inlet guide vane 
failure 





















Probable 4 Critical 3 
 
 
4.1 Risk ranking using Risk Matrix 
All of the failure modes are first determined using risk matrix. Based on the assumed failure 
probability and impact scales for each failure mode, a figure of risk level for every failure mode 
is shown for better understanding. There are 12 figures showing the products of probability, P 
and consequence, C. The results are risk rating, their category level and the risk acceptance 
level for Risk 1 until Risk 12. Later the results of risk ranking for each failure mode are 






Risk no. 1: Overspeed 
Figure 9. Risk level of overspeed 
Risk rating = 8 
Serious risk – Not desirable 
 
Risk no. 2: Rotor out of balance 
Figure 10. Risk level of rotor out of balance 
Risk rating = 10 






Risk no. 3: Rotor bend distortion 
Figure 11. Risk level of rotor bend distortion 
Risk rating = 6 
Serious risk – Not desirable 
 
Risk no. 4: High temperature 
Figure 12. Risk level of high temperature 
Risk rating = 16 







Risk no. 5: High vibration 
Figure 13. Risk level of high vibration 
Risk rating = 16 
Medium risk – Acceptable with review 
 
Risk no. 6: Tip rub 
Figure 14. Risk level of tip rub 
Risk rating = 14 






Risk no. 7: Blade failure or inlet guide vane 
Figure 15. Risk level of blade failure or inlet guide vane 
Risk rating = 6 
Serious risk – Not desirable 
 
Risk no. 8: Thrust bearing failure 
Figure 16. Risk level of thrust bearing failure 
Risk rating = 6 







Risk no. 9: Radial bearing failure 
Figure 17. Risk level of radial bearing failure 
Risk rating = 9 
Serious risk – Not desirable 
 
Risk no. 10: Foreign object damage 
Figure 18. Risk level of foreign object damage 
Risk rating = 10 






Risk no. 11: Explosion in combustion chamber 
Figure 19. Risk level of explosion in combustion chamber 
Risk rating = 6 
Serious risk – Not desirable 
 
Risk no. 12: Failure of refractory lining 
Figure 20. Risk level of failure of refractory lining 
Risk rating = 5 
High risk – Not acceptable 
 
As shown in these figures above, the failure risks are distributed in three risk categories which 
are high, serious and medium. None is assigned as low. Most of the failure modes of gas turbine 
system which are six in total have serious risk level. Five failure modes have medium risk and 
only single has high risk that is Risk 12 (Failure of refractory lining). Based on risk 
39 
 
categorization acceptance shown in Table 6, the failure has high risk require immediate action 
and detailed research to reduce the level of risk because such failure is not acceptable. The 
failure modes have serious risk level need as soon as practicable action to minimize the risk 
level because they are not desirable. As for medium risk level, preventive plans are needed to 
avoid the risk of the failure modes but they are acceptable with review. 
 
4.2 Risk ranking using Borda Method 
Results of failure risks assessed are shown in Table 14. The results are obtained from the 
estimated probability and consequences scale of risk assessment matrix for gas turbine system. 
Even though the failure are categorized into 4 different risk levels: low, medium, serious and 
high, there are still risk ties happened. The results show that there are five failure modes of gas 
turbine system have medium risk and six failure modes have serious risk. Nevertheless, there 
is one failure mode has high risk. Unfortunately, it is impossible to determine which risk from 
medium, serious and high categories is more critical. Hence the use of Borda ranking method 
is most useful to improve associated risk levels of the gas turbine system failure modes.  
After defining the number of scale for failure probability and consequence of each failure 
modes, the number assigned are used and the bi values were calculated using Equation 1. For 
every failure mode, the calculation process is shown as follows for better understanding. 
 
Risk no. 1: Overspeed 
𝑏1 =  ∑(𝑁 − 𝑟1𝑘) = (12 − 8)
𝑘
+ (12 − 0) = 16 
  
Risk no. 2: Rotor out of balance 
𝑏2 =  ∑(𝑁 − 𝑟2𝑘) = (12 − 8)
𝑘
+ (12 − 1) = 15 
 
Risk no. 3: Rotor bend distortion 
𝑏3 =  ∑(𝑁 − 𝑟3𝑘) = (12 − 4)
𝑘




Risk no. 4: High temperature 
𝑏4 =  ∑(𝑁 − 𝑟4𝑘) = (12 − 0)
𝑘
+ (12 − 10) = 14 
Risk no. 5: High vibration 
𝑏5 =  ∑(𝑁 − 𝑟5𝑘) = (12 − 0)
𝑘
+ (12 − 10) = 14 
 
Risk no. 6: Tip rub 
𝑏6 =  ∑(𝑁 − 𝑟6𝑘) = (12 − 8)
𝑘
+ (12 − 1) = 15 
 
Risk no. 7: Blade failure or inlet guide vane 
𝑏7 =  ∑(𝑁 − 𝑟7𝑘) = (12 − 4)
𝑘
+ (12 − 1) = 19 
 
Risk no. 8: Thrust bearing failure 
𝑏8 =  ∑(𝑁 − 𝑟8𝑘) = (12 − 4)
𝑘
+ (12 − 1) = 19 
 
Risk no. 9: Radial bearing failure 
𝑏9 =  ∑(𝑁 − 𝑟9𝑘) = (12 − 0)
𝑘
+ (12 − 9) = 15 
 
Risk no. 10: Foreign object damage 
𝑏10 =  ∑(𝑁 − 𝑟10𝑘) = (12 − 8)
𝑘
+ (12 − 1) = 15 
 
Risk no. 11: Explosion in combustion chamber 
𝑏11 =  ∑(𝑁 − 𝑟11𝑘) = (12 − 4)
𝑘
+ (12 − 1) = 19 
 
Risk no. 12: Failure of refractory lining 
𝑏12 =  ∑(𝑁 − 𝑟12𝑘) = (12 − 0)
𝑘
+ (12 − 1) = 23 
41 
 
The calculated bi values are 16, 15, 19, 14, 14, 15, 19, 19, 15, 15, 19, and 23. Based on these 
values, the Borda ranking for each failure modes executed is as shown in Table 14.  The most 
critical failure mode is clearly Risk 12 because it has Borda rank of 0. The number zero means 
that no failure mode is more critical than Risk 12 and this failure mode needs immediate action 
plan. Four risks have Borda ranking 1 are the second most critical which are Risk 2, Risk 7, 
Risk 8 and Risk 11. Risk 1 has Borda ranking 5 which means there are 5 more critical failure 
modes than failure mode overspeed. Four failure modes have Borda ranking 6 and they should 
be given fair attention. The last two failure modes which are Risk 4 and Risk 5 have Borda 
ranking 10 and they should be treated only after 10 more vital failure modes are given attention.   
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ranking Category Scale Category Scale 
1 Overspeed Remote 2 Catastrophic 4 8 Serious 16 5 
2 
Rotor out of 
balance 




Occasional 3 Critical 3 6 Serious 19 1 
4 High temperature Probable 4 Negligible 1 16 Medium 14 10 
5 High vibration Probable 4 Negligible 1 16 Medium 14 10 
6 Tip rub Remote 2 Critical 3 14 Medium 15 6 
7 
Blade failure or 
inlet guide vane 
failure 

























CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
Failure modes of gas turbine system, their failure range rate, failure consequence and associated 
risks were assumed and classified using semi-quantitative risk matrix. The Borda ranking 
method was used to minimize the risk ties exist in risk matrix ranking. Failure of refractory 
lining in combustion chamber was found having high risk. It needed most attention compared 
to other failure modes. Overspeed, rotor bend distortion, blade failure or inlet guide vane failure, 
thrust bearing failure, radial bearing failure and explosion in combustion chamber were 
categorized as serious risk. Out of these six, rotor bend distortion, blade failure or inlet guide 
vane failure, thrust bearing failure and explosion in combustion chamber required more 
attention for treatment based on Borda ranking method. Then only overspeed and radial bearing 
failure should be treated, respectively. Lastly, there are five medium risks which are rotor out 
of balance, high temperature, high vibration, tip rub and foreign object damage. According to 
Borda evaluation, rotor out of balance, tip rub and foreign object were found demanding more 
urgent action than high temperature and high vibration. The last two should be treated last 
because they are the least critical. Risk matrix is an approved tool of semi-quantitative risk 
assessment to evaluate failure risk because the feasible way to risk and easy-to-use feature. 
Although risk ties exist in risk matrix but with the introduction of Borda method, the risk 
assessment matrix developed becomes more efficient to analyze the failure risks as it managed 
to reduce the risk ties exist in the risk matrix method. The objective of this project is achieved 
where a risk assessment model for gas turbine is successfully developed. Every failure risks 
associated with gas turbine system are well assessed and discussed. This study can be further 
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